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ABSTRACT 
In 1906, the United States instituted its first drug laws. Over time, 
drug prohibition and criminalization have continued, becoming what 
is known today as the “War on Drugs.” This Article examines the 
political economy of the War on Drugs with particular emphasis on 
the unintended consequences of drug prohibition. This Article 
analyzes the effects of prohibition on violence, drug potency, and 
cartelization in the drug market. In addition, it examines how the 
drug policies of the U.S. government have led to a progressive 
militarization of domestic police forces, fostered an erosion of civil 
liberties, and contributed to the weakening of private property. The 
Article concludes that drug prohibition works against many of the 
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stated goals of its advocates and offers an alternative to present drug 
policy. 
INTRODUCTION 
n October 9, 2012, police executed a “no-knock” warrant on the 
home of Mr. and Mrs. Fasching in Billings, Montana.1 While 
conducting their mission, police dropped a flash grenade into the 
bedroom of the Fasching’s twelve-year-old daughter.2 The ensuing 
blast left the girl with first- and second-degree burns on over fifty 
percent of her body.3 A few months earlier, in May 2011, police in 
Pima County, Arizona, stormed a series of homes, equipped with full 
SWAT gear and an armored personnel carrier.4 Police entered the 
home of a twenty-six-year-old former Marine, Jose Guerena, who, 
after telling his wife and four-year-old son to hide in a closet, armed 
himself and prepared to face who he thought were intruders.5 Reports 
later confirmed that Guerena had not fired his weapon nor turned off 
the safety when officers opened fire, striking the young father twenty-
three times in less than seven seconds, killing him.6 In both of these 
cases, police entered the homes to execute raids searching for drugs or 
drug-related activity. No drugs of any kind, or any evidence of drug-
related exploits, were found in either residence. In both instances, 
however, innocent civilians had their property and person violated by 
the violent actions of police. 
These two cases are far from isolated incidents. Between 1985 and 
2011, police executed more than 375 botched raids in search of drugs 
or drug-related activity in which innocent civilians, police officers, 
and non-violent offenders were killed, innocent suspects had their 
property trespassed, sickly individuals or medical professionals were 
wrongfully raided, or excessive force was used.7 Like the two 
opening cases, each of these raids was conducted as part of the 
	
1 Mike Riggs, 12-Year-Old Girl Has Second Degree Burns from SWAT Flash Grenade 
Detonated During Wrong-Door Raid, REASON: HIT & RUN BLOG (Oct. 12, 2012, 1:06 
PM), http://reason.com/blog/2012/10/12/12-year-old-girl-has-second-degree-burns. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Radley Balko, Jose Guerena Killed: Arizona Cops Shoot Former Marine in Botched 
Pot Raid, HUFF POST: POL. (May 25, 2011, 6:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2011/05/25/jose-guerena-arizona-_n_867020.html?. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Botched Paramilitary Police Raids, CATO INST., http://www.cato.org/raidmap/index 
.php?type=1# (last visited Mar, 2, 2013). 
O
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broader “War on Drugs.” Since President Richard Nixon first 
declared drugs to be a serious threat to the United States in the early 
1970s, state and local authorities, as well as the U.S. government, 
have increasingly expanded their efforts to combat illicit drugs. In 
1980, a total of 580,900 people were arrested on drug-related 
charges.8 By 2011, the number of drug arrests exceeded 1.5 million, 
and more than twenty-five percent of the U.S. prison population was 
incarcerated as a result of drug offenses.9 During its inaugural year in 
1973, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) employed 2,898 
people and had an annual budget of $74.9 million.10 By 2011, the 
DEA employed nearly 10,000 people with a budget of over $2 
billion.11 Annually, the War on Drugs costs U.S. taxpayers over $51 
billion.12 
The U.S. government’s goals for the War on Drugs are wide 
reaching. For instance, the National Drug Control Strategy Goals for 
2012 called for a reduction in “illicit drug consumption” and an 
“improve[ment] [of] the public health and public safety of the 
American people.”13 Former U.S. Attorney General Richard 
Thornburg presented the following as the objectives of U.S. drug 
policy: 
[We] must face up to the daunting challenge of facing down drug 
abusers and drug traffickers. . . . [O]ur responsibility is to disrupt, 
dismantle, and destroy drug trafficking enterprises. This ambitious 
agenda reaches across the full spectrum of drug activity. We intend 
to disrupt the drug marketplace by displacing sellers and users alike. 
. . . [W]e intend to destroy the very infrastructure of these criminal 
conglomerates. . . . [T]he United States [has been] one of the first 
nations to . . . enhance law enforcement efforts worldwide. . . . 
[T]here will be no safe havens.14 
	
8 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 165148, DRUGS AND 
CRIME FACTS 59, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/dcf.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 
2013) [hereinafter DRUG AND CRIME FACTS]. 
9 Drug War Statistics, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE, http://www.drugpolicy.org/drug-war     
-statistics (last visited Mar. 2. 2013). 
10 DEA Staffing and Appropriations: FY 1972-2011 (All Sources), DRUG 
ENFORCEMENT ADMIN.: STAFFING AND BUDGET, http://www.justice.gov/dea/about 
/history/staffing.shtml (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). 
11 Id. 
12 Drug War Statistics, supra note 9. 
13 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 
STRATEGY 3 (2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp 
/2012_ndcs.pdf. 
14 Dick Thornburg, U.S. Attorney Gen., Goals in the War on Drugs 3–4, 8, 10 (Apr. 30, 
1990), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistory/thornburgh/1990/04-30-90.pdf. 
BOETTKE (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2013  2:09 PM 
1072 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 1069 
As this quote indicates, many negative consequences are attributed to 
the drug trade. Some argue that in addition to destroying people’s 
health, drugs decrease societal wealth and employment, promote 
crime, corrupt law enforcement, and spread disease.15 But has the 
federal government’s War on Drugs curtailed these negative 
outcomes? Have the past and present policies worked to “disrupt, 
dismantle, and destroy”16 the purveyors of illicit substances? This 
Article argues that the U.S. government has not only failed in its 
efforts to stop drug use among American citizens, but that the 
prohibition of drugs has in fact worked against many of the strategic 
goals summarized above. As the opening examples and recent 
statistics regarding expenditure and arrests illustrate, the War on 
Drugs has immensely impacted the lives of many individuals in a 
variety of capacities.17 Through the policies of prohibition and the 
War on Drugs, the U.S. government has produced several negative 
unintended consequences. These include increasing the amount of 
drug-related crime and violence (both domestically and 
internationally), inducing the spread of deadly diseases, and 
increasing the likelihood of overdose for persons who consume illicit 
drugs. Moreover, the War on Drugs has led to mass spending on 
incarceration and drug interdiction activities, criminalized a large part 
of the American populace, and negatively impacted employment 
prospects for millions of individuals. Prohibition policies have 
encouraged cartelization in the drug industry both domestically and 
abroad. Finally, the War on Drugs has adversely impacted American 
citizens by eroding civil liberties and changing the overall structure of 
state and local law enforcement. 
Part I offers a brief history of prohibition in the United States in 
order to examine how the scope and scale of the War on Drugs has 
changed over time. Part II provides an overview of the economics of 
prohibition and explains the mechanisms through which drug policies 
	
15 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-98-111, LAW ENFORCEMENT: 
INFORMATION ON DRUG-RELATED POLICE CORRUPTION (May 1998), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/gg98111.pdf; NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND HOMELESSNESS 1–2 (July 2009), available at http://www 
.nationalhomeless.org/factsheets/addiction.pdf; Drugs and Crime Facts, BUREAU OF JUST. 
STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/dcf/duc.cfm (last visited Mar. 2, 2013) [hereinafter 
Drug and Crime Facts]; Drug Facts: HIV/AIDS and Drug Abuse: Intertwined Epidemics, 
NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (May 2012), http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drug 
facts/hivaids-drug-abuse-intertwined-epidemics. 
16 Thornburg, supra note 14, at 4. 
17 See Drug War Statistics, supra note 9. 
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impact individuals, the drug industry, and other areas of the economy. 
Part III examines how the War on Drugs has impacted law 
enforcement throughout the United States. Specifically, this Part 
examines how policies regarding drugs have led to the increasing 
militarization of domestic police forces and how this has perpetuated 
the erosion of civil liberties over time. Part IV describes the political 
mechanisms of drug policy and discusses the challenges faced by 
those wishing to enact substantial policy reforms. The Article 
concludes by stating that drug prohibition works against many of its 
advocates’ goals and offers an alternative to present drug policy. 
I 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF PROHIBITION 
Throughout the 1700s and until the early 1900s, the U.S. 
government did not institute criminal penalties against the 
manufacture, sale, possession, or use of today’s illegal drugs.18 In 
1906, Congress began to regulate the sale and use of some substances 
via the Pure Food and Drug Act.19 The Act required substances 
containing ingredients like cocaine, morphine, heroin, alcohol, and 
cannabis to be labeled with information regarding content and 
dosage.20 
In the following decades, federal policies moved away from 
regulation toward criminalization and prohibition. In 1914, the 
Harrison Narcotics Act was passed by Congress to regulate and tax 
the market for opiates by requiring “registration of, with collectors of 
internal revenue, and . . . a special tax upon all persons who produce, 
import, manufacture, compound, deal in, dispense, sell, distribute, or 
give away opium or coca leaves, their salts, derivatives, or 
preparations.”21 Although it did not appear to criminalize drugs, the 
Act contained a clause that required physicians to only proscribe 
	
18 See Eric. E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition Politics and 
Reform, 40 VILL. L. REV. 383, 391–95 (1995). 
19 Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No 59-381, 34 Stat. 768, replaced by 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 
(codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
20 David F. Musto, The History of Legislative Control Over Opium, Cocaine, and Their 
Derivatives, SHAFFER LIBRARY OF DRUG POL’Y, http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer 
/history/ophs.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). 
21 Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785, replaced by 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. 
2, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970). 
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narcotics “in the course of his professional practice.”22 This part of 
the Harrison Act was interpreted as banning doctors from prescribing 
narcotics to addicts. The effects of the Act occurred almost 
immediately. For example, the New York Medical Journal reported 
less than six months after the bill was passed, 
[T]he immediate effects of the Harrison antinarcotic law were seen 
in the flocking of drug habitués to hospitals and sanatoriums. 
Sporadic crimes of violence were reported too, due usually to 
desperate efforts by addicts to obtain drugs. . . . The really serious 
results of this legislation, however, will only appear gradually and 
will not always be recognized as such. These will be the failures of 
promising careers, the disrupting of happy families, the commission 
of crimes which will never be traced to their real cause, and the 
influx into hospitals for the mentally disordered of many who would 
otherwise live socially competent lives.23 
By 1938, over 25,000 physicians were arraigned on narcotics charges 
as a result of the Harrison Act, and 3,000 served time in prison.24 
Between 1920 and 1933, the United States placed a constitutional 
ban on the sale of alcohol. In addition to ushering in the well-known 
era of moonshine, rum-runners, and speakeasies, the Eighteenth 
Amendment also led to significant increases in arrests. Arrests for 
drunkenness and disorderly conduct increased forty-one percent.25 
Drunk driving arrests increased by eighty-one percent.26 The number 
of federal convicts increased by 561 percent and total federal 
expenditures on penal institutions increased by 1,000 percent.27 
In the years following prohibition, marijuana use became more 
widespread. As a result, Congress passed the Marihuana Tax Act of 
1937.28 The legislation levied a tax of approximately $1.00 per year 
on anyone who dealt commercially with marijuana, hemp, or 
cannabis.29 Violation of the Act could result in five years 
imprisonment and a fine of $2,000.30 
	
22 Id. 
23 Mental Sequelae of the Harrison Law,  N.Y. MED. J., May 15, 1915, at 1014, 1014. 
24 LAWRENCE KOLB, DRUG ADDICTION: A MEDICAL PROBLEM 146 (1962). 
25 William A. Meredith, Organized Crime and Prohibition, U. OF ALBANY (Apr. 29, 
2005), http://www.albany.edu/~wm731882/organized_crime1_final.html. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551, repealed by 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 
1101, 84 Stat. 1236, 1292 (1970). 
29 Id. ch. 553, § 2(a)(2). 
30 Id. ch. 553, § 12. 
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In 1951, Congress passed the Boggs Act, the first law requiring 
mandatory minimum sentencing for drug offenses.31 Five years later, 
the Narcotics Control Act increased the penalties and allowed for the 
death penalty in cases in which heroin was sold to individuals under 
the age of eighteen.32 
In the early 1970s, President Nixon declared drugs to be “public 
enemy number one.”33 During his presidency, concerns over the 
“drug problem” in the United States grew once again. In 1970, 
Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act (CDAPC).34 CDAPC brought many separate federal 
mandates under a single law and established a schedule of controlled 
substances.35 In 1972, the House voted unanimously to authorize a 
“$1 billion, three-year federal attack on drug abuse.”36 The DEA was 
created the following year to enforce all federal drug laws and 
coordinate broader drug interdiction activities.37 Under the direction 
of the DEA, the War on Drugs expanded internationally and led to 
more drug arrests than ever before. 
By 1980, there were approximately 376,000 drug related arrests a 
year.38 By the end of the decade, that number climbed to almost one 
million annually.39 President Ronald Reagan declared a “War on 
Drugs” in 1982, leading to a further tightening of drug laws, more 
arrests, and harsher sentencing. That same year, the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld a ruling imposing a forty-year prison sentence on a 
Virginia man convicted of possession of nine ounces of marijuana 
(about $200 worth), reversing the ruling of two lower courts, which 
	
31 Boggs Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-255, 65 Stat. 767, amended by Narcotics Control 
Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, 70 Stat. 567. 
32 Narcotics Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, § 107, 70 Stat. 567 (1956). 
33 Telephone Remarks to Students and Educators Attending a Drug Education Seminar 
in Monroe, Louisiana, 321 PUB. PAPERS 1019 (Oct. 4, 1971), available at http://www 
.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3179. 
34 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 
Stat. 1236 (1970). 
35 Id. 
36 THOMAS SZASZ, CEREMONIAL CHEMISTRY: THE RITUAL PERSECUTION OF DRUGS, 
ADDICTS, AND PUSHERS 223 (rev. ed. 2003) (citing $1 Billion Voted for Drug Fight, 
SYRACUSE HERALD-J. Mar. 16, 1972, at 32.). 
37 Drug Enforcement Administration History: 1970–1975, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT 
ADMIN., http://www.justice.gov/dea/about/history.shtml (last visited Mar. 4, 2013). 
38 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DECADES OF DISPARITY: DRUG ARRESTS AND RACE IN 
THE UNITED STATES 5 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/03/02 
/decades-disparity-0. 
39 Id. 
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found the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment.40 In another case, a twenty-one-year-old man in 
Arizona was sentenced to a two-year prison term for sniffing paint 
under the pretense that “intoxicating sniffers can grow violent.”41 In 
1988, working under her “Just Say No” campaign, First Lady Nancy 
Reagan provided a clear window into the federal government’s stance 
on illegal drugs, “[A]ny user of illicit drugs is an ‘accomplice to 
murder’ . . . ‘There is no middle ground. We must be as adamant 
about the casual user as we are about the addict.’”42 
Throughout the 1990s and the first decade of the new millennium, 
the DEA and the U.S. government expanded the scope of anti-drug 
operations once again, looking to curtail the use of substances like 
crack cocaine, methamphetamine, and the steady increase in 
prescription drug abuse. By the end of 2012, the DEA operated 226 
domestic offices in twenty-one distinct divisions throughout the 
United States and collaborated with over 300 state and local 
agencies.43 The global footprint of the DEA also expanded as its 
international operations grew to include eighty-six foreign agencies in 
sixty-seven different countries.44 The list of banned substances also 
continued to grow. By the end of 2012, more than 150 substances 
would be considered a Schedule I controlled substance,45 and a first-
time offense for trafficking such a substance might include a twenty-
year prison sentence, as well as a $1 million fine.46 Further, if “death 
or serious bodily injury occurs,” an individual could face life 
imprisonment as well as a fine of $5 million.47 Penalties for simple 
possession also tightened. Possession of any amount of marijuana, for 
example, might carry a federal penalty of up to one year in jail and a 
	
40 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 371, 374–75 (1982); see also Supreme Court 
Roundup: 40-Year Term Held ‘Legislative Prerogative,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1982, at 
B15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1982/01/12/us/supreme-court-roundup-40-year 
-drug-term-held-legislative-prerogative.html?. 
41 Szasz, supra note 36, at 229 (citing E. Hume, Sniffing Paint Gets Man 2-Year Jail 
Term, ITHACA J., Feb. 11, 1982, at 29). 
42 Steven V. Roberts, Mrs. Reagan Assails Drug Users, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1 1988, at 
A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/01/us/mrs-reagan-assails-drug-users 
.html (comments by First Lady Nancy Reagan). 
43 DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DEA FACT SHEET 1 (Dec. 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/resource-center/statistics.shtml. 
44 Id. 
45 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 (2012). 
46 Federal Trafficking Penalties, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., http://www 
.justice.gov/dea/druginfo/ftp3.shtm (last visited Mar. 4, 2013). 
47 Id. 
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$1,000 fine on the first offense.48 Moreover, distributing or 
cultivating marijuana in relatively small amounts (fifty to ninety-nine 
kilograms) might result in a twenty-year prison sentence and a 
$1,000,000 fine.49 
Given the expansion of drug enforcement activities and the 
increase in penalties for drug-related crime, the elections in 
November 2012 raised questions regarding prohibition laws in the 
United States, particularly as they relate to marijuana. Although 
Washington state and Colorado voted to legalize the drug, it is unclear 
how these new measures will be received by federal authorities. Since 
the federal government does not recognize any use of marijuana as 
legal, federal drug penalties may still be enforced even in states with 
more lenient drug laws. Exactly how the disconnect between state and 
federal laws will play out in practice is thus presently uncertain. 
II 
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF PROHIBITION 
We begin with the assumption, as stated by proponents of 
prohibition, that the policies of the federal government are intended to 
reduce the use of drugs and drug abuse, disrupt the drug supply chain, 
reduce violence and drug-related crime, and dismantle the 
mechanisms through which drugs reach users. The question that 
naturally follows is whether the means employed are suitable to 
achieve these ends. Economic analysis can provide insight into this 
question by tracing the chain of consequences associated with policies 
of drug prohibition. 
Proponents of prohibition argue that by banning certain substances, 
they can reduce both the supply and demand for drugs and 
significantly shrink or eliminate the drug market. What proponents 
fail to realize, however, is that making drugs illegal does not 
eliminate the market for drugs, but instead forces the buying and 
selling of drugs into an underground “black market.” Prohibition 
essentially acts as a “tax” on sellers in the drug market.50 Vendors 
must incorporate the potential fines, prison time, and costs of evading 
capture into their business plans.51 This extra “tax” has the effect of 
	
48 Federal Penalties, NORML, http://norml.org/laws/item/federal-penalties-2 (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2013). 
49 Federal Trafficking Penalties, supra note 46. 
50 Jeffrey A. Miron & Jeffrey Zwiebel, The Economic Case Against Drug Prohibition, 
J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1995, at 175, 176. 
51 Id. 
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driving lower-cost sellers out of the market. The end result is fewer 
suppliers and higher drug prices.52 Although the decrease in supply 
and increase in price may at first appear to support the goals of 
prohibition, the higher prices and changes in the market structure 
generate several unintended consequences which work directly 
against stated policy goals. 
The first unintended consequence of prohibition is that individuals 
are more likely to consume poisonous substances and overdose with 
the increase in drug prices. As the price of a given drug rises, it 
creates additional profit opportunities for those willing to enter the 
drug trade. Since the drug market is illegal, and therefore, conducted 
underground, quality control is reduced compared to “above ground” 
markets. Drug users have few means available to determine which 
drugs are “pure” and have no recourse should they purchase a 
substance of inferior quality. Further, the underground market allows 
for less information sharing about products and vendors because 
transactions take place secretly to avoid authorities. Consequently, 
more poor-quality drug products enter the market, which leads to a 
greater potential for poisoning and overdose. 
The greater prevalence of poor-quality drugs is not the sole 
mechanism through which overdoses increase. The illegality of drug 
use generates unintended “potency effects,” which affect both the 
supply and demand sides of the drug market. On the supply side, 
prohibition results in drug dealers carrying and selling more potent 
drugs. Because drug laws increase the risk of selling low potency 
drugs, suppliers tend to substitute toward higher potency drugs. For 
example, under prohibition, suppliers prefer to transport cocaine, as 
compared to marijuana, because cocaine is more potent and therefore 
more valuable per unit. 
On the demand side, drug prices are driven up by prohibition, 
which causes drug users to seek “more bang for their buck.” That is, 
since the overall cost of obtaining drugs is higher, more potent drugs 
are relatively cheaper than “weak” drugs. Because drug users must act 
illegally to obtain drugs, they seek to maximize the satisfaction or 
“high” from each dollar spent. This dynamic manifests itself in 
	
52 See Jeffrey A. Miron, The Effect of Drug Prohibition on Drug Prices: Evidence from 
the Markets for Cocaine and Heroin, 2003 NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RESEARCH WORKING 
PAPER NO. 9689, at 178, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9689.pdf?new 
_window=1; MARK THORNTON, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 157: ALCOHOL 
PROHIBITION WAS A FAILURE (July 1991), available at http://www.cato.org/publications 
/policy-analysis/alcohol-prohibition-was-failure. 
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several ways. Drug users may switch from lower potency to higher 
potency within a given drug (for example, from marijuana with lower 
levels of THC to marijuana with higher levels of THC). Alternatively, 
drug users may switch from substances like marijuana to “harder” 
drugs like cocaine and heroin. Finally, drug users may employ more 
intense methods of drug use, such as injection. 
Taking both sides of the market together, prohibition leads to a 
greater use of more potent substances, which increases the likelihood 
of overdose and drug-related death. Indeed, these effects may be seen 
in the rate of unintended overdose deaths in the United States. In 
1971, two years before the creation of the DEA and the year President 
Nixon declared drugs to be a public menace, just over one death per 
100,000 deaths was due to an overdose.53 By the year 2007, over 
27,500 people died as a result of a drug overdose, which translates to 
almost ten per 100,000 deaths.54 Between 1990 and 2007 alone, 
overdose rates increased five-fold.55 The most common sources of 
overdose deaths are higher potency drugsmainly cocaine, heroin, 
and opioid painkillers.56 
The second unintended consequence of prohibition is adverse 
health effects through increased disease transmission. As noted, 
prohibition causes the relative price of drugs to change, pushing users 
toward “harder” drugs and more intense methods of ingestion, like 
injection. At the same time, prohibition reduces the availability of 
items used in conjunction with drugs—like needles. Lack of clean 
needles leads drug users to either re-use or share needles with other 
drug users, which increases the likelihood of disease transmission. 
Therefore, drug users face a higher risk of contracting diseases like 
hepatitis and HIV/AIDS. In 2000, approximately 60 percent of new 
Hepatitis C infections and 17 percent of new Hepatitis B infections 
occurred in intravenous drug users.57 The prevalence of disease 
among drug users has not gone unnoticed by those within the health 
community and federal drug agencies. As the number of drug users 
infected with these diseases has increased, it has led to increases in 
	
53 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, UNINTENTIONAL DRUG POISONING IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1 (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/homeandrecreationalsafety/pdf/poison  
-issue-brief.pdf. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 NAT’L ALLIANCE OF STATE & TERRITORIAL AIDS DIRS., VIRAL HEPATITIS & 
INJECTION DRUG USERS 7 (2006), available at http://www.nastad.org/Docs/Public 
/Publication/2006213_NASTAD_IDUStandAlone.pdf. 
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health care costs associated with treatment. In 2010, 23.8 percent of 
all emergency department visits were attributed to the use of illicit 
drugs.58 Approximately 6.9 percent of all hospital admittances in 
2004 were a result of illegal drug use.59 
The adverse health effects of drug prohibition have led many to 
advocate that needles be made available to drug users despite the 
illegality of drugs.60 In 1998, the federal government banned the use 
of government funds for needle exchange programs.61 As a result, 
private charities and state and local agencies have incurred the cost of 
such programs. By 2007, 185 needle exchange programs were 
operating in 36 states.62 Thus, prohibition not only increases health 
care costs directly by creating conditions that promote the spread of 
disease, but also creates expenses for charities and organizations. 
Since federal funds are unavailable, state and private agencies have 
incurred the cost and diverted scarce resources to programs aimed at 
subsidizing the market for needles by making clean needles more 
readily available to drug users. 
The third unintended consequence of prohibition is an increase in 
drug-related violence. Those who offer prohibition as a solution to the 
“drug problem” contend that drug use leads to violence by drug users 
and that, by making drugs illegal, violence will decrease. This view 
fails to recognize that because drugs are illegal, those involved in the 
underground market cannot use formal legal channels to resolve 
disputes or to seek protection for their business dealings. Instead, drug 
sellers and buyers must resolve their own problems, which fosters 
increased instances of violence in place of more peaceful means of 
resolving disputes. 
	
58 DRUG ABUSE WARNING NETWORK, THE DAWN REPORT: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2010 
DRUG ABUSE WARNING NETWORK (DAWN) FINDINGS ON DRUG-RELATED EMERGENCY 
DEPARTMENT VISITS 2 (July 2, 2012), http://www.samhsa.gov/data/2k12/DAWN096 
/SR096EDHighlights2010.htm. 
59 S. Binks et al., Prevalence and Healthcare Burden of Illegal Drug Use Among 
Emergency Department Patients, 22 EMERGENCY MED. J. 872, 872 (2005). 
60 The American Medical Association, American Nurses Association, American Public 
Health Association, American Bar Association, and others endorse needle exchange 
programs to address these health issues. 
61 Alan Franciscus, Needle Exchange—A Matter of Public Health: So Why is the 
Government Playing Politics with this Ticking Time Bomb?, HCV ADVOCATE, http://www 
.hcvadvocate.org/hepatitis/About_Hepatitis_pdf/1.1_Hepatits_C/needle_exchange.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
62 Ctr. for Disease Control, Syringe Exchange Programs–United States, 2005, MMWR 
WEEKLY, Nov. 9, 2007, at 1164, 1164, available at http://www.cdc.gov/MMWR/preview 
/mmwrhtml/mm5644a4.htm. 
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Further, under prohibition, individuals in the drug trade are 
automatically criminals. Because those involved in the market are, by 
definition, already committing a crime, prohibition lowers the relative 
cost of committing subsequent criminal actions (like assaulting a drug 
dealer following a bad sale) relative to a situation where drugs are 
bought and sold on a legal market. 
Moreover, prohibition may unwittingly encourage violence, as 
those involved in the illegal drug market can rely on violence to gain 
power. Likewise, those harmed may turn to violence in the absence of 
legitimate dispute resolution options. 
Statistics indicate that it is the prohibition of drugs that leads to 
more crime, not the drug use itself.63 One study of homicides in New 
York City found that only 7.5 percent of the murders committed in 
1988 resulted from the mental and physical impact of drug use.64 
However, 39 percent of all homicides, and 74.3 percent of drug-
related homicides were related to the “exigencies of the illicit market 
system.”65 These crimes occurred mostly between drug dealers, or 
between dealers and users over territorial disputes, as a result of 
dealer robberies, or as a result of drug-related debts.66 Further, a 2004 
survey of prisoners found that 16.6 percent of all state inmates and 
18.4 percent of individuals in federal custody admitted to committing 
their crimes specifically to obtain drugs.67 
A fourth unintended consequence of drug prohibition is 
cartelization in the drug industry. Although prohibition is intended to 
“disrupt and dismantle” such enterprises, it has the opposite effect in 
practice. As prohibition increases the benefits and lowers the cost of 
committing violent acts, and as high production costs keep smaller 
sellers from entering the drug trade, cartels are more likely to appear 
in the drug market. In a legalized drug market, new entrants could 
penetrate the market, forcing a cartel to incur incredibly high costs in 
order to maintain its monopoly. This would mean that, over time, the 
monopoly would likely be eroded. Under prohibition, however, a 
cartel may use violence to drive out smaller competitors and more 
	
63 See generally Andrew J. Resignato, Violent Crime: A Function of Drug Use or Drug 
Enforcement?, 32 APPLIED ECON. 681 (2000). 
64 Paul J. Goldstein et al., Crack and Homicide in New York City: A Case Study in the 
Epidemiology of Violence, in CRACK IN AMERICA: DEMON DRUGS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
113, 116–17 (Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine eds., 1997). 
65 Id. at 118. 
66 Id. at 116. 
67 Drugs and Crime Facts, supra note 15. 
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easily maintain its monopoly. These effects are self-enforcing. The 
cartelization of the market further increases drug prices, which 
increases the benefits of using violence to maintain control of the 
market. This in turn further increases the likelihood of a violent 
cartel.68 
Examples of cartelization in the drug market are numerous. Similar 
to how the American Mafia vastly expanded its operations during 
alcohol prohibition, the prohibition of opium in 1919 led to the 
development of powerful and violent Chinese gangs.69 Colombian 
economist Eduardo Sarmiento Palacio has found that the U.S. War on 
Drugs has led to the rise of Colombian drug cartels. He found that as 
production of a drug is eliminated in one geographic area, like the 
United States, supply conditions are such that production will quickly 
move elsewhere, like Colombia.70 Another example of cartelization 
can be seen in Mexico where drug cartels earn nearly $30 billion 
annually trafficking cocaine, heroin, and other drugs into the United 
States.71 These cartels have also been responsible for numerous 
kidnappings, extortion, human trafficking, and more than 60,000 
deaths since 2006 alone.72 
In addition to the claims that prohibition decreases violence, 
cartelization, and disease, prohibition supporters also argue that 
prohibition decreases societal wealth because people who are on 
drugs are assumed to be less productive.73 But this view fails to 
consider the fifth unintended consequence of prohibition—how the 
policies of prohibition and criminalization impact education and 
employment. For one, the higher prices of drugs, resulting from the 
War on Drugs, provides an incentive for some students to drop out of 
school in order to potentially profit from the lucrative drug trade. This 
	
68 Miron & Zwiebel, supra note 50, at 178–79. 
69 Stergios Skaperdas, The Political Economy of Organized Crime: Providing 
Protection When the State Does Not, 2 ECON. GOVERNANCE 173, 176–77 (2001). 
70 See generally Eduardo Sarmiento, Economica del Narcotráfico, in NARCOTRAFICO 
EN COLOMBIA: DIMENSIONES POLÍTICAS, ECONÓMICAS, JURÍCAS E INTERNACIONALES 
47, 47–75 (2d ed., Carolos Gustavo Arrieta eds., 1991) (Colom.). 
71 Ioan Grillo, Hit Mexico’s Cartels with Legalization, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/opinion/hit-mexicos-cartels-with-legalization.html 
?_r=0. 
72 Id. 
73 See Drug Use and Crime, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index 
.cfm?ty=tp&tid=352 (last updated Aug. 10, 2009). 
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temptation is especially prevalent in inner-city neighborhoods where 
poverty is more likely to be an issue.74 
The War on Drugs affects educational opportunities in other ways 
as well. A single conviction for drug possession, for example, renders 
students automatically ineligible for federal student aid, including 
grants, loans, and work-study. The period of ineligibility varies 
depending on the type of offense and number of offenses, but 
individuals with multiple offenses who fail to complete a 
rehabilitation program may become permanently ineligible.75 It is 
estimated that approximately 20,000 students each year are ineligible 
for Pell Grants due to drug offenses.76 An additional 30,000 to 40,000 
students are denied student loans.77 
Penalties for a drug conviction, however, do not end at the 
educational level. If convicted of a felony drug charge (which in some 
states requires only 0.75 ounces of marijuana), an individual may lose 
his ability to hold employment in a federal office, enlist in the armed 
forces, obtain a federal license (import, customs, etc.), or acquire a 
passport.78 Moreover, many job applications require background 
checks and disclosure of felony convictions, which may prohibit 
individuals convicted of drug offenses from obtaining employment in 
the private sector. The implication is straightforward: prohibition 
directly impacts employment by prohibiting individuals with drug 
convictions from obtaining certain types of work. Moreover, 
prohibition retards the development of human capital by excluding 
those convicted of drug crimes from certain types of educational 
assistance. Therefore, while prohibition may increase productivity by 
preventing some drug use, this gain is undermined by the loss in 
productivity from lost education and employment opportunities. 
	
74 Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, Have We Lost the War on Drugs?, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 4, 2013, 8:39 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324374004578 
217682305605070.html. 
75 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-238, DRUG OFFENDERS: VARIOUS 
FACTORS MAY LIMIT THE IMPACTS OF FEDERAL LAWS THAT PROVIDE FOR DENIAL OF 
SELECTED BENEFITS 51–52 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items 
/d05238.pdf. 
76 Doug Lederman, Drug Law Denies Aid to Thousands, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Sept. 28, 
2005), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2005/09/28/drug. 
77 Id. 
78 KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, FACT SHEET: IMPACT OF DRUG CONVICTIONS ON 
INDIVIDUAL LIVES 1–2, available at http://www.kcba.org/druglaw/pdf/drugconviction.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2013). 
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A sixth unintended consequence of the War on Drugs is an increase 
in the corruption of public officials and civil servants. The high prices 
of drugs, and the associated high profits for drug traffickers and 
dealers who avoid capture and punishment, incentivizes these 
individuals to bribe the array of public actors—police, military, 
elected officials, judges—involved in combating the illegal drug 
trade.79 Given the violence prevalent in the illegal drug market, those 
who refuse bribes are often threatened with violence against 
themselves and their families. In Mexico, “[e]nforcing current [drug] 
laws to prosecute criminals is difficult because members of the cartels 
have infiltrated and corrupted the law enforcement organizations that 
are supposed to prosecute them, such as the Office of the Attorney 
General.”80 In the United States, a recent investigation by the 
Associated Press found that “U.S. law officers who work the border 
are being charged with criminal corruption in numbers not seen 
before, as drug and immigrant smugglers use money and sometimes 
sex to buy protection, and internal investigators crack down.”81 As 
these examples illustrate, by artificially raising the price, and 
therefore profitability, of illegal drugs, prohibition provides a stronger 
incentive for corruption by those involved in enforcing laws. 
These six categories of negative unintended consequences 
demonstrate that prohibition works against many of the stated policy 
objectives. In addition, there are further consequences of the War on 
Drugs and drug prohibition that are unrelated to the drug market 
itself. While it is expected that drug prohibition impacts drug crime 
and the producers, suppliers, and consumers of drugs, it is not 
immediately obvious how the War on Drugs and the prohibition of 
illegal substances impacts the lives of the general public. This subject 
will be discussed in the next Part. 
III 
DOMESTIC POLICE MILITARIZATION AND THE WAR ON DRUGS 
In 1915, the first narcotics agents were issued three things along 
with their badge—a Thompson submachine gun and two hand 
	
79 Becker & Murphy, supra note 74. 
80 Arturo Zamora Jimenez, Criminal Justice and the Law in Mexico, 40 CRIME LAW & 
SOC. CHANGE 33, 33 (2003). 
81 Martha Mendoza & Christopher Sherman, AP Investigation: Border Police Being 
Busted More, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Aug. 9, 2009), http://www.utsandiego.com/news 
/2009/aug/09/us-drug-war-border-corruption-080909/. 
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grenades.82 Modern tools of the trade include Kevlar vests and 
helmets, riot shields, automatic weapons, and tactical and intelligence 
training.83 The first drug laws were enforced by an existing agency—
the Prohibition Unit of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.84 Today, the 
DEA, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
(ATF), Federal Bureau of Prisons, Central Intelligence Agency, 
Center for Disease Control, U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border 
Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of 
Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Drug Intelligence 
Center, Office of National Drug Control Policy, Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration, and others work to fight the War on Drugs. 
But the enhanced weaponry and tactical and intelligence training of 
the War on Drugs has not remained solely in the realm of the federal 
government. The botched drug raids in Montana and Arizona 
discussed in the Introduction, for example, were not conducted by 
teams of DEA, ATF, or federal immigration forces, but by local 
police departments.85 What these cases and the progression of drug 
enforcement weapons from “Tommy guns” to assault rifles 
demonstrate is a broader trend of domestic police militarization—
police forces have acquired more military-like characteristics over 
time. 
The United States has historically worked to create rules that 
delineate the functions of local police from those of the military. State 
and local law enforcement, for example, are to uphold domestic laws 
that protect the rights of citizens. Their goal is not to eliminate 
criminals physically, but to maintain public order and “keep the 
peace.” They are to “serve and protect” the rights of victims and 
criminals alike. They are trained to use violence only as matter of last 
resort. Military forces, however, are trained to engage in combat with 
the goal of destroying an external enemy deemed to be a threat to the 
	
82 Drug Enforcement Admin. Museum & Visitors Center, Exhibit, Illegal Drugs in 
America: A Modern History (last visited by Article’s authors 2012) [hereinafter Exhibit, 
Illegal Drugs in America]. For additional information regarding the Exhibit, see Illegal 
Drugs in America: A Modern History, Drug Enforcement Admin. Museum & Visitors 
Ctr., http://www.deamuseum.org/ida/index.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 See Riggs, supra note 1; Balko, supra note 4. 
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rights of U.S. citizens.86 Despite historical efforts to make laws that 
enforce this distinction, U.S. drug policies have led to a progressive 
breakdown of this distinction.87 That is, domestic law enforcement 
has taken on the characteristics of the armed forces by engaging in 
military-like training, acquiring military weapons, and utilizing 
military tactics in everyday operations.88 While historical instances of 
police militarization tended to be specific and geographically 
concentrated, the War on Drugs allowed for militarization on a 
national scale.89 This continued militarization has contributed to an 
erosion of the rule of law, mass criminalization, and a deterioration of 
civil liberties. The War on Drugs has differed greatly from other 
conflicts in U.S. history. In prior conflicts, the “enemy combatants” 
were external to the United States. In the War on Drugs, however, 
enemies have consisted not only of South American drug cartels, 
Chinese opium growers, and Mexican marijuana farmers, but also of 
American citizens. 
Militarization was accelerated through a series of legislation in the 
1980s, such as the Military Cooperation with Civilian Law 
Enforcement Officials Act (MCCLEOA), whereby the federal 
government was allowed enhanced ability to combat the drug 
problem.90 The MCCLEOA allowed the Department of Defense 
(DOD) to share information with local police, participate in local 
counter-drug operations, and transfer equipment and other materials 
to domestic law enforcement as long as the local agencies were 
enforcing drug, immigration, or customs laws.91 In the first three 
years following the MCCLEOA’s passage, the DOD granted nearly 
10,000 requests for weapons and assistance from state and local law 
	
86 U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY FM 7-10, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL: 
RIFLE COMPANY, INFANTRY AND AIRBORNE BATTLE GROUPS 3–4 (1962), available at 
http://www.survivalebooks.com/free%20manuals/1962%20US%20Army%20Vietnam%2
0War%20Rifle%20Company%20Infantry%20&%20Airborne%20Battle%20Groups%203
26p.pdf. 
87 Abigail R. Hall & Christopher J. Coyne, The Militarization of U.S. Domestic 
Policing, 18 THE INDEP. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
88 A full history of the distinction between state, local, and military functions is beyond 
the scope of this work. For an overview of the history of police militarization, see id. 
89 Id. 
90 Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies Act, Pub. L. No. 97-86, 95 
Stat. 1114 (1981) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 371–82). 
91 Id. 
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enforcement.92 Program 1033 was passed in 1997 and allowed the 
DOD to transfer excess military equipment to state and local law 
enforcement, including body armor, aircraft, armored vehicles, 
weapons, riot gear, watercraft, and surveillance equipment.93 
Although many departments are eligible, preference is given to state 
and local agencies focused on counter-drug and counter-terrorism 
activities.94 In 2010 and 2011, new records were set with $212 and 
$500 million in equipment transfers through the program, 
respectively.95 
The breakdown of the distinction between local and military forces 
may also be seen in programs offered by agencies like the DEA and 
the FBI. Having expanded from a single multi-bureau task force in 
1970, the DEA now works with over 300 state and local agencies to 
enforce drug laws.96 In addition to providing specialized training for 
local law enforcement, in 2009 the DEA managed more than 380 task 
forces nationwide that work to coordinate information and promote 
resource sharing among state and federal agencies.97 Similarly, the 
FBI expanded its Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) with the 
purpose of sharing intelligence, training, and other knowledge across 
agencies. As of 2012, there are more than 100 JTTFs across the 
United States, which include over 4,400 personnel from over 600 
local agencies and fifty federal agencies.98 
The War on Drugs has also led to massive seizures of personal 
property. Through use of the Asset Forfeiture Program, the DEA has, 
by “[w]orking with other local, state, national, and international law 
enforcement agencies . . . seized record[] amounts of cash, assets, and 
	
92 PETER REUTER ET AL., RAND CORP., SEALING THE BORDERS: THE EFFECTS OF 
INCREASED MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN DRUG INTERDICTION 54 (Jan. 1998), available 
at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3594.pdf. 
93 Department of Defense Excess Property Program (DoD 1033), Missouri Dep’t of 
Pub. Safety, http://www.dps.mo.gov/dir/programs/cjle/dod.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
94 Id. 
95 Madison Ruppert, The Pentagon’s 1033 Program: Giving Free Military Equipment 
to Police Departments Around the U.S., ACTIVIST POST (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www 
.activistpost.com/2011/12/pentagons-1033-program-giving-free.html. 
96 See DEA Programs: State and Local Task Forces, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT 
ADMIN., http://www.justice.gov/dea/ops/taskforces.shtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
97 Id. 
98 Protecting America from Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces, FED. 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION: TERRORISM, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate 
/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
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other drug-related proceeds.”99 The program allows the government 
to seize assets that “represent the proceeds of, or were used to 
facilitate federal crimes.”100 Between 1989 and 2009, an estimated 
$10.9 billion dollars in assets were seized by authorities at an average 
growth rate of 20 percent per year.101 These assets include real estate, 
vehicles, commercial businesses, cash, financial instruments, jewelry, 
art, watercraft, and aircraft.102 State and local police have benefitted 
immensely from the confiscation and sale of private property, 
receiving more than $561 million in 2011 alone to “supplement 
funding for law enforcement initiatives.”103 
The implications for this type of program are straightforward. If a 
state or local police force depends on the proceeds from asset seizures 
to supplement its budget, then it has clear incentives to “seek out” 
offenses in which it would be able to seize assets. This not only leads 
to increased use of military tactics, but also increases the likelihood of 
police corruption. For example, agents have greater incentive to 
engage in unauthorized or unethical activities (like intense 
interrogation activities or planting evidence) in order to confiscate 
materials and enhance their budget. These incentives may be observed 
in the statements of one Utah mayor following a vote by the city 
council that authorized the combination of police bonuses with seized 
assets: “Why not give our guys a reason to be more aggressive? . . . If 
the city gets a house through a drug forfeiture, and we . . . sell it for 
$50,000, then . . . the guy who made the bust is going to get a nice 
bonus check.”104 This creates the perverse incentives to seize first and 
ask questions later.105 
	
99 DEA Programs: Asset Forfeiture, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., http://www 
.justice.gov/dea/ops/af.shtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
100 Asset Forfeiture Program: Overview of the Asset Forfeiture Program, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/jmd/afp/ (last updated Jan. 2013). 
101 Mary Jane Borden, Forfeiture Facts from Drug War Facts, DRUG WAR FACTS, 
http://drugwarfacts.org/cms/files/Forfeiture-Facts-from-Drug-War-Facts.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2013). 
102 Asset Forfeiture Program, U.S. MARSHALLS SERV., http://www.usmarshals.gov 
/assets/index.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). 
103 Id. 
104 Helper OKs Giving Officers ‘Bonuses’ for Drug Busts, Desert News (Jan. 31, 1995, 
12:00 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/401745/HELPER-OKS-GIVING-
OFFICERS-BONUSES-FOR-DRUG-BUSTS.html?pg=all (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
105 See Marc B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture, Burdens of Proof and the War on Drugs, 83 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 274, 337 (1992); SCOTT EHLERS, DRUG POLICY FOUND., 
POLICY BRIEFING: ASSET FORFEITURE 8–11 (1999), available at http://www.drugpolicy 
.org/docUploads/Asset_Forfeiture_Briefing.pdf. 
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IV 
THE PERPETUATION OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES AND 
MILITARIZATION 
To understand the growth and perpetuation of the War on Drugs 
and the unintended consequences it generates, it is necessary to 
understand the political economy underlying the support for these 
policies.106 Doing so provides insight into the dynamics discussed in 
previous Parts, as well as why changes to existing drug policies would 
likely face fierce opposition. 
To appreciate the continuation of drug prohibition policies one 
must first understand the innate predispositions of government 
bureaucracies, as this is the most common organizational structure of 
those engaging in drug enforcement. Unlike firms that operate in a 
market setting, bureaucracies do not function under signals of profit 
and loss. Instead of measuring effectiveness based on profits earned, 
bureaucratic agencies base success on the size of their discretionary 
budgets and the number of subordinates under their command.107 
This results in competition, not over profit in private markets, but 
over the distribution of a given pool of government resources. The 
potential for securing additional funds creates an incentive for 
government bureaus to engage in lobbying efforts to secure as much 
of the available budget as possible. 
One result of this tendency is “mission creep”—that is, bureaus 
look to expand their portfolio of activities to increase the size of their 
budgets and the number of personnel they employ.108 By expanding 
the size and scope of their activities, bureaucrats look to signal to 
other parts of the government and the public that they are engaged in 
providing crucial services.109 This expansion is then used to justify 
requests for additional funding and more employees.110 This tendency 
is particularly important to this analysis, as there is an inherent 
tendency for drug enforcement agencies, police, and the military to 
expand the range of their activities in order to increase their budgets 
and employees. 
	
106 “Political economy” refers to the application of the economic way of thinking to the 
political realm and the interactions by those in the polity and those in the economy. 
107 WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
38 (1971) [hereinafter NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY]; William A. Niskanen, Bureaucrats 
and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617, 618 (1975). 
108 NISKENEN, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 107, at 111. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
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These incentives have resulted in a relationship between the police, 
military, and federal forces whereby each benefits from repeated 
interactions with the others. Moreover, these incentives, as well as the 
repeated interaction between agencies, work to perpetuate current 
drug policies. Federal agencies involved in drug interdiction 
activities, looking to increase their power, budgets, and personnel, 
have incentive to expand and exert influence over the military and 
domestic police.111 Similarly, the military has incentives to exert its 
influence over federal agencies and local police. By providing 
weapons, training, and other resources for the War on Drugs, the 
military effectively augments its powers by exerting influence over 
other agencies. Domestic law enforcement agencies benefit as well. 
By extending operations and focusing on enforcing federal drug 
policies, they may acquire additional funds and staff. Once domestic 
police forces acquire additional funding, tactical training, and 
weaponry, they face an incentive to use this training and equipment to 
justify the spending while seeking further increases. The result of this 
process is the aforementioned blurring of the police-military 
dichotomy as police increasingly acquire military characteristics. 
Moreover, this provides a clear avenue for the expansion of anti-drug 
activities as each agency looks to increase its activities. 
In addition to the economics of bureaucracy, the perpetuation of 
the War on Drugs may also be attributed to special interest groups 
that work to influence government for the benefit of their members. 
Special interest groups, like bureaus, compete for funds. This results 
in an intense political competition as these groups finance campaigns, 
work to influence public opinion, and lobby Congress. They attempt 
not only to preserve the status quo, but also look to expand 
government spending and influence resource allocations in a way that 
will benefit their members. Due to these underlying objectives, this 
means that even when ineffective or counterproductive policies are 
enacted, there is little pressure for special interest groups to reform or 
remove said policies. 
Among the groups supporting continuation of drug prohibition, 
perhaps the most influential have been police and prison guard 
unions. Police departments throughout the United States have become 
increasingly dependent on federal funding for drug interdiction 
efforts. One program, Community Oriented Policing Services, 
allocated about $10 billion to more than 12,000 agencies in less than a 
	
111 See Hall & Coyne, supra note 87. 
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decade.112 These funds, and the potential for enhanced profits, 
prompted these groups to push for expanded drug laws. If the drug 
laws were to be relaxed, it would mean smaller budgets for police 
forces. In 2008, for example, the National Fraternal Order of Police 
(FOP) lobbied Congress to increase the penalties for offenses 
involving particular types of narcotics, to create a registry and public 
database for persons convicted of certain drug offenses, and to 
establish increased penalties and mandatory sentences for individuals 
involved in “large drug trafficking organization[s].”113 The FOP also 
lobbied for stiffer penalties against individuals who “threat[en] . . . 
violence against law enforcement officers” and increased regulation 
on products used to manufacture drugs.114 Each of these policies, if 
passed, would expand the resources available to police in order to 
enforce the more stringent laws. 
Private prisons, like police and prison guard unions, have a strong 
interest in not just sustaining the status quo, but in increasing the 
number of individuals incarcerated. One way of working toward this 
outcome is to lobby governments to pass more stringent drug laws. 
This ensures an ongoing stream of criminals to incarcerate. Private 
prisons derive most of their income from government contracts; 
therefore, their profits are directly tied to the number of individuals 
incarcerated.115 Revenue for the two largest private prison businesses 
total nearly $3 billion annually.116 In 1990, private prisons contained 
an average of 7,771 inmates at a given time.117 By the end of 2009, 
that number had soared to 129,336—an increase of 1,664 percent.118 
	
112 Peter Eisler & Kevin Johnson, 10 Years and $10B Later, COPS Drawing Scrutiny, 
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Taken together, these insights from political economy indicate that 
once set in motion, prohibition policies—whether effective or not—
will tend to be self-enforcing and self-extending over time. The ever-
growing War on Drugs illustrates this dynamic. Problems emerge 
when these policies generate negative unintended consequences or 
when they are altogether ineffective. Ideally, changes to policies and 
rules would be made quickly in response to unintended consequences. 
However, political institutions are inclined to adapt slowly given the 
inherent tendencies of bureaucracy and the nature of vested interests. 
This means that policies that fail to achieve the desired end will 
continue to persist even though they are a net cost, the burden of 
which falls on ordinary citizens. 
CONCLUSION 
The state has several mechanisms it can use to decrease the use of a 
substance. It can increase taxes, use the legal system to remove 
manufacturers from the market, or it can altogether prohibit the 
substance. For the past 100 years, the U.S. government has attempted 
to use prohibition as a means to decrease drug use and curtail drug-
related violence. Despite these efforts, however, there are good 
reasons to conclude that prohibition and the War on Drugs have failed 
to achieve the goals stated by proponents of prohibition. The United 
States has the largest prison population of any country,119 high levels 
of violent crime, and more drug addicts than other developed 
countries.120 In 1900, just before the United States passed its first 
prohibitive piece of legislation, one in every 200 Americans was 
addicted to some kind of drug.121 By the year 1992, that number 
increased to one in every 100.122 
The analysis presented in this Article reveals two main 
implications. First, proponents of drug prohibition must appreciate 
and address the full range of their policy’s consequences. The Article 
has discussed how prohibition is not only costly in a direct pecuniary 
sense, but that policies regarding illicit drugs have led to more drug-
related violence, increased cartelization in the drug industry, and 
driven individuals to seek more potent substances and intense 
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methods of drug use. This has led to an increased chance of overdose 
and has worked to spread infection and deadly disease. It follows that, 
if the ends sought by government are decreased drug abuse, less drug 
violence, and an elimination of dangerous drug operations, then 
current policies have failed to meet the desired goals. 
Second, the analysis in Part IV demonstrates why drug policies are 
unlikely to change radically in the near future. Given the bureaucratic 
nature of government agencies and the work of special interest 
groups, there is no foreseeable end to the War on Drugs. Further, 
there is no clear mechanism through which the War on Drugs could 
be easily undone given the array of actors involved who benefit from 
the perpetuation of prohibition. In this regard, perhaps the best 
options are to continually express the negative unintended 
consequences of prohibition and to demand that proponents 
appreciate and address the full costs of the policies they advocate. 
These implications raise the question—what is the proper policy 
regarding drugs? Given the stated goals of politicians and drug 
crusaders that drug policy should reduce drug-related violence, drug 
abuse, and dangerous cartels, one could argue that decriminalization 
and legalization would better achieve these outcomes than 
prohibition. If drugs were to be legalized, the market for illicit 
substances would no longer be forced to operate underground. 
Bringing drugs into the open market would have significant effects. 
First, it would allow a greater quantity of drugs to come to market, 
which would reduce the cost. While prohibition drives up the cost of 
drugs and induces drug users to seek more potent drugs and methods 
of use, a decrease in cost and easier access would likely decrease the 
potency of many drugs and foster a decrease in methods like 
injection. Consider that under alcohol prohibition people drank more 
vodka and moonshine because they were of relatively high 
potency.123 After prohibition, more people drank mass-produced, less 
potent beer and wine.124 
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Second, the legalization of drugs would allow for disputes within 
the drug industry to be resolved through the traditional legal channels 
instead of resorting to violence. Disagreements regarding price, 
quality, and contracts would no longer have to be settled violently as 
contracts could be enforced in a court of law. By legalizing drugs, the 
U.S. government would effectively increase the cost of engaging in 
drug-related violence. Since prohibition decreases the relative cost of 
committing another crime in conjunction with a drug-related offense, 
it follows that legalization would have the opposite effect. One may 
anticipate that a free market for drugs would mean less drug-related 
crime, not more. Alcohol prohibition gave rise to Al Capone. The end 
of prohibition gave rise to the liquor store and liquor aisle in the 
supermarket. Ending prohibition would not only reduce drug-related 
violence in the United States, but in Mexico as well. Third, 
decriminalization would reduce the rapidly growing U.S. prison 
population and save significant monetary resources associated with 
trying and housing prisoners charged with and convicted of drug-
related crimes. Fourth, decriminalization would lower the cost of 
medical treatment and counseling for those suffering from drug 
addiction and who seek help. Finally, legalizing drug use would also 
provide an incentive for entrepreneurs to develop alternatives to 
dealing with drug addiction.125 
Opponents of legalization may argue that such a policy would 
mean more drug use and more drug addicts. This question is 
empirical, as we cannot know ex ante how many users would exist as 
a result of legalization. It seems telling, however, that the number of 
addicts in the United States has increased since drug prohibition, not 
decreased. In 1900, one in every 200 Americans was addicted to some 
sort of drug.126 By 1992, it was one in every 100.127 During alcohol 
prohibition, arrests for drunk and disorderly conduct increased by 
forty-one percent.128 Arrests for drunk driving increased eighty-one 
percent.129 Major crimes including murder, assault, and burglary also 
saw sharp increases during prohibition.130 However, these rates 
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returned to pre-prohibition levels following the repeal of prohibition 
in 1933.131 Consider that Portugal decriminalized drug use in 2001 
(drug trafficking remains illegal) with some success.132 For example, 
a study of the Portugal experience found that since decriminalization, 
imprisonment due to drug-related charges has fallen, clinic visits 
related to drug addiction have increased as individuals seek assistance 
in stopping drug use, deaths related to opiates have fallen, and the use 
of drugs by the young has increased only moderately.133 Cases such 
as Portugal, as well as the decriminalization of marijuana in several 
U.S. states, can serve as “event studies” to consider the effects of 
removing the barrier to a legal drug market. Even with these 
unknowns, one thing is certain—ignoring the insights from 
economics regarding drug prohibition will not annul these insights, 
but prohibition will continue to waste resources and impose 
significant costs, both economic and non-economic, on innocent 
people around the world. 
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